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 Abstract 
Discussions of African responses to Covid-19 have focussed on the state and its international backers. 
Far less is known about the role of a wider range of public authorities, including chiefs, professional 
associations, faith-based and civil society organisations, humanitarians, criminal gangs, local security 
services and armed groups. We begin to fill this gap by investigating how the pandemic provided 
opportunities for claims to and contests over power in areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Uganda and South Sudan. Ethnographic research is used to argue that local forms of public authority can 
be akin to miniature sovereigns, able to interpret dictates, policies, and advice as they see fit. It reveals 
how alongside coping with existing complex protracted crises, many try to advance their own agendas 
and secure political, social, and material benefits. However, it also shows how those they seek to govern 
do not passively accept the new normal, instead often finding room to challenge those in positions of 
power and influence. We assess which, if any, of these actions and reactions will have lasting effects on 
local notions of statehood and argue for the utility of a public authorities lens in times of crisis. 
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Introduction 
On 14th of February 2020 an asymptomatic Chinese national was identified as Africa’s first confirmed 
case of Covid-19. The second and third on 25th February were Italian nationals in Algiers and Lagos. Just 
over a year and two waves of infections later, the World Health Organisation (WHO) reported 3,111,360 
confirmed cases on the continent, leading to 78,840 deaths (WHO, 2021a). Evidence was also emerging 
from seroprevalence surveys in sub-Saharan Africa that many nations may have been undercounting 
their infections and that the second wave was far more aggressive than the first (Usaf and Roca, 2021; 
Salyer et al., 2021). Concerned commentators began sounding the alarm that Africa might be heading 
for a devastating third wave, with only 7 million people vaccinated across a population of around 1.2 
billion and a case fatality ratio of 3.6 percent, compared to the global average of 2-3 percent (WHO, 
2021a).  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not been 
through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may lead to 
differences between this version and the Version of Record. Please cite this article as doi: 
10.1111/disa. .12513
2 
 
Despite these worrying signs, Africa’s Covid-19 morbidity and mortality rates remain strikingly low when 
compared with those in Europe, the United States and Latin America. There, despite many countries' 
clear financial and technological advantages, a mixture of poor preparedness and political leadership 
have been blamed for the worst health crises since the 1918 influenza pandemic, popularly known as 
the Spanish flu. Africa’s Covid-19 rates are also a lot less than the continent’s estimated annual rate of 
malaria infection of around 20 million (leading to 400,000 deaths) or the 1.1 million Africans infected 
with HIV (470,000 dead from related illnesses in 2018) (WHO, 2021c; WHO, 2021d). The death toll is also 
just less than double the 40,000 Nigerians estimated to die every year in road traffic accidents (WHO, 
2019). This highlights that while African countries' death tolls are comparatively low so far, their 
capacities to deal with communicable diseases and unhealthy behaviours are extremely limited.   
Commentators have variously argued that Africa benefits from a host of favourable preconditions and, 
less commonly, that it has found innovative ways to combat Covid-19’s spread. The former include its 
young population, low rural population densities, pre-existing cross-reactive SARS-CoV-2 immunity, low 
levels of mobility and low incidences of non-communicable comorbidities (Anjorin et al., 2021; Rice et 
al., 2021). The latter include cheap testing kits, the upscaling of cashless e-commerce, community 
reporting structures, effective regional collaborations, and the repurposing of systems established to 
address previous health crises (Senghore et al., 2020; Smith and Crone, 2020; Travaly and Mare, 2020). 
However, most analysts agree that further research is needed to disaggregate the impact of such factors 
on the virus's effects and to inform country specific solutions that address future waves (Boum et al., 
2021).   
Whatever the conclusions, Beninese economist, Professor Leonard Wantchekon, declared during a July 
webinar on leadership: “catastrophe has been averted” because of a mixture of “what Africa is and what 
Africa has done” (FLCA, 2020). Indeed, the pandemic has, once again, directed focus towards African 
governance. Much has been made of the relative speed and decisiveness with which some states 
responded (Pilling, 2020). Recent research based on quantitative data has shown that many sub-Saharan 
African states’ outpaced Europeans’ efforts (Crone, 2021). For example, on average they told people to 
stay at home just 13 days after the first confirmed case, whilst European states took 27 days. Sub-
Saharan African states also often imposed stricter measures. These included restrictions on movement 
within countries and across borders, rules around social distancing and the wearing of face masks, and 
the cessation of normal socio-economic activities. African leaders, therefore, have been praised for 
exercising power in ways that may have made up for their countries’ significant disadvantages with 
respect to health systems, testing capacity and data analytics. This, some have hoped, may spur a sea-
change in African governance styles, as leaders turn their backs on inward looking international donors 
that increasingly seem intent on engaging in vaccine nationalism (Lopes, 2020).   
Yet, as analyses of the actions of political leaders and states continue, much less attention is being paid 
to what is happening on the ground, in the cities, towns and villages that are home to the majority of 
Africans and those that directly govern them. A focus on their experiences and understanding of the 
pandemic may help commentators move past tired ‘Africa needs our help, again’ vs. ‘Africa can teach us 
lessons!’ discourses (Horton, 2020). In their place, we can begin to ask what aspects of the African 
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states’ responses to COVID-19 are important to people’s everyday lives, and what the lasting effects 
may be.  
This is particularly vital for places already suffering from conflict, displacement, acute deprivation, 
health crises and political upheaval, or where people are fearful of state officials, security forces, and 
possibly also international agencies. In such places, COVID-19 is another test of people’s resilience and 
the leadership of those claiming positions of authority. These are the kinds of places the authors of this 
paper study, live in and come from. They include countries such as Uganda, South Sudan, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), all of which have long histories of wars, epidemics, and 
humanitarian emergencies. To varying extents their states are also unable or unwilling to govern their 
entire populations, let alone provide robust health systems able to face the latest pandemic. 
Sometimes termed ‘fragile or conflict-affected states’ by the international humanitarian and 
development community, the OECD (2018) estimates that without concerted action 80 percent of the 
global poor will live in such circumstances by 2030. For many, this means residing in places where 
authority and the provision of public goods may effectively be subcontracted out by the government, or 
may in practice fall to a range of local and international actors that people understand as representing, 
vaguely replicating or replacing the state. Sometimes too, those exercising authority and governing 
people may have nothing much to do with the central state or its institutions, or they may even be 
actively opposed to them. They can include local traditional chiefs, self-help groups, kinship networks, 
professional associations, faith-based groups, civil society organisations, multinational companies, 
humanitarian agencies, security services, organized criminal gangs, militias and rebels.  
We suggest that all of these actors are ‘public authorities’, which we define as ‘any kind of authority 
beyond the immediate family that commands a degree of consent’ (CPAID 2018:8). As they order 
people’s everyday lives, they uphold, support, interpret or reject prevailing social norms, and state and 
international policies (Lund, 2006; Hoffmann and Kirk, 2013). Successful claims to legitimate authority 
allow some to occupy roles as societies’ moral guardians, deciding what constitutes acceptable 
behaviour, who is and is not part of the community, and who does and does not deserve vital public 
goods such as access to health services, security and justice. Some also use the state’s weakness and 
crises to attempt to introduce new rules, institutions and political orders. Such public authorities can, we 
argue, be akin to miniature sovereigns, able to shape people’s lives and their experiences of the state in 
ways that have significant impact. 
To explore such dynamics, many of the paper’s authors provided vignettes of life under, and public 
authorities’ responses to, the pandemic in the places they intimately know.i Each drew upon their 
existing networks and ongoing research to provide snapshots from responses to Africa’s first wave of 
COVID-19. Those living and working in Uganda were present for the early months of the COVID-19 crisis 
and observed as participants in their communities. They also talked with neighbours and contacts in 
institutions including health and education services, political parties and the newly established response 
forces discussed later. Those in the DRC were already undertaking extensive fieldwork in Nord Ubangi 
and Kongo Central, and in Ebola affected areas in North Kivu, the latter in collaboration with a team of 
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local investigators, also covering issues related to social service provision in Goma and Bukavu. The 
research included interviews with local stakeholders, including health workers, civil society leaders and 
ordinary citizens. As the new crisis unfolded, observations were made and participants asked questions 
about the response measures. One researcher based in South Sudan travelled between Bor and Juba 
during the pandemic’s initial waves, conducting related qualitative research for academic and 
humanitarian organisations. He contributed his observations from extensive time spent among 
communities facing the virus and a governance vacuum. All the authors also followed and recorded 
common reactions to state broadcasts and other press and social media coverage. Researchers based 
across African research sites shared vignettes with researchers based in Europe and the US, and 
research teams analysed the material together, communicating remotely via Whatsapp, conferencing 
software and email. The patterns that emerge highlight the opening up of pathways and possibilities for 
different sorts of African public authorities and those they seek to govern. 
This disruption can be seen in at least three ways across the studied countries: Shifts in the balance of 
power between the state and other actors; contests for control over narratives and resources; and 
resistance to responses. Each speaks to the utility of a public authority lens for uncovering how the 
pandemic is affecting people's lives, and for what may be temporary coping strategies and what may be 
part of or lead to long-term changes. Through the vignettes, we are also able to see beyond the 
posturing and policies of national level leaders to how pandemic responses were experienced in places 
that are often written off as ungovernable or already subsumed within protracted crises. This is 
important for those wishing to help the design of future responses to Covid-19 waves and similar events, 
and it holds insights into the making and unmaking of statehood in places where governance is not 
monopolised. 
The next section briefly explores the concept of, and relevant research on, public authority in Africa. We 
then turn to recent research from parts of Uganda, the DRC and South Sudan where public authorities 
are shown to have had varying degrees of agency to enact and reinterpret state policies, yet where 
people have rarely uncritically accepted them. The paper concludes with a discussion of how trends 
identified through a public authority lens can add to understandings of responses to the pandemic, 
policy-making and statehood. 
 
Public Authority in Crises 
The term ‘public authority’ has long been used to refer to instruments and organisations created by 
legislation to further public interests and provide public goods, such as healthcare, education, security 
and justice. In Europe and the United States, it has often been used in conjunction with the police, parts 
of the army, and various forms of, sometimes semi- or fully- autonomous, local administration. Indeed, 
there is nothing exceptional about public authority to Africa in particular or developing countries in 
general.  
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Contemporary academic interest in African public authorities emerged from ethnographic literature that 
explored the micro-politics of post-colonial states. Many of its foundational authors produced research 
that countered depictions of them as eroding or failed polities with vast swaths of ungoverned, insecure 
territory. For example, Hagberg (2006) explored a charismatic leaders’ ‘making and unmaking’ of public 
authority in Burkina Faso; Menkhaus (2006) described the bargaining processes that lead to a ‘mediated 
state’ in areas in Sub-Saharan Africa emerging from conflict; Olivier de Sardan (2008) ‘the practical 
norms’ of everyday governance beneath the state; Raeymaekers et al. (2008) ‘governance without 
government’ in situations of protracted crises; Hagmann and Péclard (2010) how ‘negotiated statehood’ 
arises through contests over legitimacy; and Leonard and Samantar (2011) the ‘local social contracts’ 
and ‘proto-state systems’ that can form where older regimes have retreated. Each showed how a variety 
of actors, from street level bureaucrats and security services to customary, business and faith leaders, 
civil society organisations, vigilante and armed groups, claim positions of authority and, often creatively, 
attempt to introduce the ‘rules of the game’ that govern people by combining the provision of vital 
public goods with appeals to popular and emerging social norms (North, 1990). 
Christian Lund (2006) was one of the first to explicitly label these authors as focussed on ‘public 
authority’. He argued that they were revealing how African public authorities variously seek to govern in 
cooperation with, alongside, in opposition to and out of view of states. Yet, he used Abrams’ (1988) 
distinction between the state as a system of tangible organisations and as an idea to explore how even 
where they have no formal relationship with central authorities, many still draw on its symbolic 
repertories and mimic the practices of states. Among others, this mimicry can include taxation, the 
wearing of uniforms, bureaucratic procedures and judicial-like decision making. It also often involves 
purposefully blurring distinctions between state and non-state, formal and informal, and official and 
unofficial through the creative blending of popular and emerging social norms – sometimes termed 
‘institutional bricolage’ – to introduce new modes of governance and advance public authorities’ own 
ends (Cleaver, 2001).  
Lund (2006) suggested that this research agenda was showing how through their constant innovations 
and references, African public authorities ‘‘bring the state back in’, but in a very different way from that 
described by Skocpol and others in the mid-1980s (Skocpol, 1985)’. By this he meant that the idea of the 
state is rarely absent from the claims to, contests over and exercise of power, even in places where the 
official state’s apparatus appears absent or is rejected. This acknowledges that, contrary to some of the 
more polemical state fragility literature, few places are untouched by experiences of the colonial or 
postcolonial state, and few people opposed to some form of statehood. Nonetheless, Lund encouraged 
further studies of how public authority manifests across Africa rather than any concerted effort to craft 
a rigorous universal definition or theory. 
Researchers working across sub-Saharan Africa have since documented a variety of processes that lead 
to public authority, with many concentrating on borderlands, conflict-affected and peripheral places. 
Among their many contributions, two streams of research that describe political ordering and statehood 
in times of crises are identifiable:  
 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
6 
 
The first is interested in how public authorities – sometimes with its permission or acquiescence – 
appropriate from central states the ability to proclaim the ‘state of exception’ as part of efforts to 
legitimise their power (Schmitt, 1985). Studies of vigilantes in South Africa, the governance of the 
Ethiopian–Somali frontier, and leaders’ appeals to the spiritual and occult in Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone 
and Nigeria have suggested that a key tactic of aspiring public authorities is to define the thresholds of 
inclusion and exclusion with political communities, and permissions to contravene normal practices or 
laws, and to create new ones (Buur 2006; Hansen and Stepputat 2005, 2006; Hagmann and Korf 2012). 
This can include declarations of who should receive public goods such as protection or a fair trial, and 
who can be considered ‘bare life’ and, thereby, legitimate targets of derision, oppression and even 
violence (Agamben 1998). As part of this, public authorities often claim that they are protecting society 
from some spiritual, moral or physical crisis.  
Among this stream, Allen’s (2015) work in northern Uganda showed how a religious leader in Gulu was 
able to strengthen his claims to legitimate authority by holding an ‘election’ to exile a man accused of 
being a vampire responsible for ongoing child murders and, therefore, a worthy subject of vigilante 
violence. Such actions were supported by local councillors, members of parliament, government officials 
and even the police. Allen argues that the leader engaged in a form of ‘moral populism’ that explicitly 
linked ‘notions of good and bad’ with formal state practices to claim that he represents ‘the will or the 
best interests of the people’ (ibid:2). On a larger scale, Pendle’s (2020) recent work in South Sudan 
describes how a female Neur prophet built a community of followers able to violently reject the central 
state. However, the prophet still encouraged them to make use of state-mandated traditional courts 
presided over by chiefs. When they failed, she would draw upon customary notions of justice to 
arbitrate disputes and as part of her claim to be the only authority able to wash away the ‘pollution’ 
caused by years of corrupt central elites’ in-fighting.  
Such research demostrates how crises - spiritual or otherwise - can be periods within which the 
thresholds of inclusion become fluid, as different subjectivities – the refugee, the poor, the criminal, the 
unemployed, the homosexual, the mad, other ethnic groups etc – are excluded or deemed ‘bare life’ by 
public authorities. It also suggests that their abilities to address crises through the creative blending of 
social norms, informal and states practices, and the provision of public goods can be important sites of 
state making and unmaking in places where central authorities have not monopolised the power to 
govern. This, we argue, is important for understanding how routine or everyday state policies are 
interpreted and implemented, and what people expect from their leaders and statehood. 
The second stream of research focuses on the opportunities that arise to reconfigure social order and 
power relations during crises, when policy responses link chains of public authorities to impart new 
norms and practices. It also highlights the agency and mutuality that people can cultivate to ensure their 
own needs are accounted for. Here, we focus on ethnographies of West Africa’s Ebola epidemic from 
2013-16 and the international response. Much has been written about how it brought local culture and 
foreign, often medical and bureaucratic, norms into conflict, and how the militarisation of initiatives was 
seemingly ignorant and, in some cases, aggressively dismissive of the people’s spiritual and communal 
lives (Fairhead, 2016; Wilkinson et al., 2017). It has also been shown how the international response 
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ignored or actively disrupted preexisting accommodations that had allowed humanitarian and local 
cultures to coexist.  
Research on burials during the epidemic in Sierra Leone builds on these themes. Lipton (2017) describes 
how the response brought vast amounts of money to Freetown, including well paid jobs for youth that 
become part of official trained burial teams. However, this created tensions between what locals 
termed ‘black’ and ‘white’ death, with the teams gaining a reputation for being unwilling to bend strict 
protocols that required all bodies to be treated the same, even when this was perceived as ignoring 
grieving families' wishes, oppressive or cruel. This gave rise to ‘secret burials’ undertaken in 
coordination with authorities such as the police, the city council, and the military that were more 
aligned to ‘black’ culture, whilst still incorporating safety practices from ‘white’. Councillors in particular 
seized opportunities to become brokers between communities keen for a secret burial and relevant 
public authorities, often collecting large payments in the process. Lipton argues that: ‘beneath these 
normative tensions was a conflict between, on the one hand, the new authorities and protocols of the 
state of emergency, and, on the other, established authorities, connections, and bureaucratic channels. 
Navigating this disjuncture became a key characteristic of living through the crisis’ (Ibid:816). The result 
was new, crisis-induced, emergent forms of public authority and social order attuned to local needs and 
expectations. 
Similarly, Parker and her colleagues’ (2019) study of Mathaineh village outside of the capital found that 
locals were unwilling to call official Ebola response teams when neighbours got ill or died. Instead, a 
type of informal public mutuality was a guiding principle in the village, leading to collaborations over 
secret burials and the development of its own practices to prevent and treat Ebola, including 
continuously hydrating the sick before it was common among state and international responders. 
Nevertheless, the burials were eventually noticed by outsiders who summoned the village’s chief to a 
meeting with public authorities connected to the state at which he was threatened with large fines. The 
army was also called in to ascertain that the burials had stopped, whereupon soldiers beat villagers and 
the chief was replaced by one appointed by the state who later died in unknown circumstances.  
Alongside violations of moral and spiritual norms, the authors argue that ‘the outbreak of Ebola 
exacerbated pre-existing tensions with senior chiefdom authorities’, including imparting upon villagers 
‘a strong sense that “Ebola money” was passing them by’ (Ibid:448). This entrenched the villagers’ 
resistance to state policies and enabled the chief to further legitimise his authority by providing 
alternative practices. Notably, in Mathaineh the ratio of people recovering from Ebola was reportedly 
higher than in official treatment centres. Parker and her colleagues conclude that crisis responders need 
to understand the social norms underpinning public authority in specific places when designing 
interventions, and that they should learn from local adaptations rather than vaguely paying lip service to 
notions of community engagement. 
These two strands of inquiry explore how public authorities can, in part, create and shape moments of 
crises as they react to new policies, their followers’ expectations and opportunities to reconfigure power 
relations. They also show that ordinary people retain agency in the face of crises and disliked responses. 
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These themes frame the next section’s exploration of vignettes from Uganda, the DRC and South Sudan. 
To respect the specificities of place, they are presented by country, followed by a discussion of 
identifiable themes. The findings are unavoidably limited by the difficulties of conducting research 
during the first wave’s restrictions and uncertainties. Accordingly, they should not be assumed to be 
generalisable or objective, and read as impressions of life at that time. 
 
Patronage, resistance and love in northern Uganda 
Uganda recorded its first case of Covid-19 in March 2020. As Africa’s first wave retreated in September, 
it had only reported 4,101 confirmed cases and 46 deaths (MHU, 2020). President Museveni’s National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) government has since been praised for quickly enacting response 
measures such as restricting movement and commerce, locking down Uganda’s borders, clear public 
messaging and the establishment of response and monitoring structures at various levels of 
administration (Sarki et al., 2020). In particular, the work of 134 District Task Forces (DTFs) set up across 
the country has been highlighted for identifying risks, raising awareness, social mobilisation initiatives, 
community dialogues and engagement activities (WHO, 2020a).  
The paper’s contributing authors mainly work and live in northern Uganda, close to its borders with 
South Sudan and the DRC. These are places that have been the sites of conflicts, resistance to President 
Musveni’s long-running government and that suffer from relative underdevelopment. Here, our 
research suggests that the pandemic response made new capital and political resources available and 
quickly, sometimes violently, restructured public authority. Yet, it ultimately shows that infectious 
disease scares and crisis-politics is normal politics. 
To unpack this, it helps to focus on the work of the DTFs. As in other parts of Uganda, Gulu’s DTF was set 
up hastily and did not adhere to any clear procedural guidelines. Members were drawn from the police 
and security services; the district health office; municipal and district offices; and elected district 
councillors, as well as from civil society organisations, faith-based organisations and the regional Acholi 
cultural institution, Ker Kwaro Acholi. The DTF has nine committees, each designed to cover aspects of 
the response. The resource mobilisation committee is responsible for managing Covid-19 relief, 
including food which was scarce due to restrictions on movement and normal trade. Indeed, the food 
distribution sub-committee beneath it had by far the largest number of attendees in records of local 
meetings and was particularly popular among those hoping to run in 2021’s elections. Soon there was 
also evidence that roles were being delegated to NRM loyalists and that its politicians were donating 
money and food to the DTF with the provision that it was distributed amongst their constituents.  
Perhaps to further ensure that pandemic relief efforts strengthened the legitimacy of central authorities 
and those in their networks, President Museveni declared that those distributing food outside of the 
DTF structure would be charged with attempted murder. Opposition politicians caught doing so were 
arrested and beaten up. In contrast, regime politicians were allowed to distribute food to their 
supporters with impunity. There were also reports that NGO staff - Gulu harbours missions from most of 
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the world’s large humanitarian organizations - were offering food and relief items to politicians in 
exchange for travel permit car stickers. The way in which Gulu’s response was handled right down to the 
local level was, therefore, shaped by the long-standing efforts of central authorities to exert control over 
Uganda’s northern districts. This includes the co-optation of vital public resources that are exchanged 
for support and votes by networks of local public authorities (Macdonald and Owor, 2020). 
The speed and aggressiveness of the response measures also took many by surprise, causing enormous 
economic suffering, especially for the urban poor. While Ugandans are used to and aware of the deadly 
potential of infectious diseases, some contrasted the restrictions with the comparatively relaxed 
responses to recent outbreaks of Yellow Fever, Marburg Virus and Ebola. Added to this, many early 
confirmed COVID-19 cases were among truck drivers arriving from Kenya, Tanzania or South Sudan. For 
some, this was evidence that maladies such as COVID-19 come from outside and, sometimes, that they 
are sent or directed with malicious intent. Ugandans we spoke with also feared that limits to 
movements between districts and regions were having the effect of ‘tribalizing’ the response, 
entrenching older divisions between them. These boundaries were not only policed by highly militarized 
state actors, but also politicised militias called Local Defence Units (LDUs) (Akello, 2020). In case they 
were not enough, people were also encouraged to inform upon one another when government 
guidelines were broken. 
Despite the international praise heaped on DTFs, the state’s messaging was largely delivered through 
long, convoluted presidential addresses broadcast on television, radio and social media (NBS, 2020). 
People in Gulu, as in much of the world, listened closely in the hope of relaxations of the lockdown 
regulations, which seemed to change often without an obvious logic. Alerts were also sometimes put 
out over the radio to help security forces track down the infected. People anxiously followed them as no 
one wanted positive cases nearby for fears they would lead to all sorts of aggressive contact tracing and 
extra restrictions. As well, of course, it might expose them to the virus, which was quickly becoming a 
new struggle for people already facing challenging circumstances. 
In Gulu, ground level public authorities – such as the controllers of boreholes and the various officials 
and committees that manage village jurisdictions, markets and other daily services – were sometimes 
reported to be highly effective at encouraging or enforcing new practices like hand-washing and mask-
wearing. In contrast, people noted that public authorities linked to the state had a lack of interest in 
containment. Rather, those charged with enforcing regulations, such as the army, police, local defence 
units, and elements of the health services, refashioned and continued their illicit revenue generating 
schemes. For example, as during curfews imposed in response to supposed crime waves, security forces 
appeared to be rounding people up at random and holding them for ransom in police station cells until 
their relatives paid for their release. Many understood such actions as dependent on whatever 
Museveni had said in his most recent announcements, with levels of brutality by security forces 
fluctuating based on the cover they perceived COVID-19 policies gave them. Others presumed that there 
must be some political or economic benefit behind poorly explained restrictions, such as the banning of 
motorcycle taxis and closing of schools, though who exactly benefited was unclear. 
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Similar dynamics played out in Uganda's North West. In the early weeks, there were calls from local 
government officials and representatives of the Catholic Church in West Nile to provide clearer 
directives. Both Catholic and Anglican churches were also active in delivering public health messaging, 
and organizing congregations and the collection and distribution of tithes to the vulnerable via 
Whatsapp. The most popular radio stations in West Nile are funded by Christian dioceses, so they 
quickly became a major source of information. Perhaps for this reason, many understood COVID-19 to 
be a curse from God. Islamic leaders also propelled similar explanations: “The first thing is Allah must be 
very annoyed with us because the world cannot be punished without a crime, so it’s a punishment” 
declared a local sheik to researchers. Still, there were widespread suspicions early on, particularly 
among young men in Arua town, that lockdown measures were an act of political manipulation or a 
conspiracy designed to delay the 2021 elections. These fears were heightened as there were no local 
Covid-19 cases until months into the pandemic.  
People we spoke with were also angry that the police and military beat lockdown violators and detained 
journalists following stories that donations received by local governments and meant for distribution 
through the district’s DTF had not reached vulnerable people. Despite these harsh reprisals, some young 
men, particularly motorcycle taxi drivers and others whose livelihoods depend on daily labour, resisted 
the measures. Protests also occurred involving elders who demonstrated with bows and arrows against 
the establishment of an isolation centre in Arua. In Moyo Town, the choice of location for an isolation 
centre angered the community to the extent that a mob burnt down the home of the District 
Chairperson seen as responsible for commissioning its construction. People also promised to seek 
revenge at the ballot box. 
Ongoing research on northern Ugandans’ love-lives also revealed that the pandemic generated 
opportunities for some to challenge public authority. As in other moments when ‘normal’ ways of life 
are made impossible, cracks can become chasms, and spaces of manoeuvre to deviate from established 
norms present themselves. For example, under usual circumstances, public authorities play a large part 
in governing people’s romantic relationships. Young couples walking hand in hand can be beaten on the 
road by police; boys trying to sneak into their girlfriend’s homes may be beaten by her brothers; and 
elders and religious leaders exert significant pressure on youth who want to circumvent their wishes and 
marry outside of their orbit.  
Youth told us that pandemic curfews gave them excuses to stay at a girlfriend or boyfriend’s house 
when this would not ordinarily be allowed. Furthermore, because of restrictions on public gatherings, 
some young people who would not be able to afford to wed ordinarily were able to avoid the costs of 
large parties, often against the wishes of religious leaders, clan and family elders. Those who bent Covid-
19 measures for their benefit had excuses backed by science, public health advice and the militarized 
enforcement of the government. It was difficult for traditional authority figures to argue. Young people 
maintained a respectful and humble posture whilst ‘standing-up’ to the inhibiting authority of their 
elders. In such ways, policies crafted in response to a crisis were unintentionally used to reconfigure 
intimate power relations.  
 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
11 
 
 
Debilitating legacies, misinformation, and violence in the DRC 
On 19 March 2020 the DRC’s first case of Covid-19 was attributed to a national who had recently arrived 
in Kinshasa from France. By the time Africa's first wave was ebbing in September, there had been 10,536 
additional cases and 271 deaths (OCHA, 2020). The wave overlapped with the tail end of an Ebola 
outbreak in the country’s eastern Kivu and Ituri provinces that began in late 2018 and led to around 
2,280 confirmed deaths (WHO, 2020b). Both health crises were layered over a long-running conflict in 
the eastern provinces and recent episodes of violence elsewhere. Moreover, they were met by a 
government with few resources and little capacity to respond, and an international humanitarian and 
military presence already overstretched addressing food shortages, sanitation issues, displaced 
populations and civil conflicts (Juma et al., 2020). 
Customary authorities, such as chiefs and religious leaders, had a crucial role to play in the DRC’s 
response to Covid-19. Across the country, they raised public awareness of the virus by amplifying 
messages broadcast in local dialects by griots (town criers) and passed on regulations and protective 
measures issued by the central government in Kinshasa. They also threatened sanctions against 
recalcitrants; facilitated and led the collection of funds and goods in kind for the care of the sick in their 
communities; and protected health workers and those accused of making up infections to extract 
payments from attacks. In short, it quickly became apparent that without their involvement, the DRC’s 
response would have been ineffectual. 
Despite this, in the peaceful provincial towns of Muanda (Kongo Central) and Gbadolite (Nord Ubangi), 
social distancing measures were not scrupulously followed by many. As in parts of Uganda, resistance to 
measures was largely due to the low number of cases. Many people, therefore, doubted the virus’ 
existence, with others believing that black people were immune or that the high rates of deaths in the 
West are ‘divine punishment’ for white people’s immorality. These ideas were particularly acute in 
Muanda, where the DRC’s charismatic or traditional ‘black churches’ (Vuvamu, Bundu Dia Kongo/BDK, 
Dibundu dia Kongo dia Banduenga/DKB, etc.) spread those ideas to their followers. This misinformation 
fed into related narratives about corruption, including suspicions about the Ministry of Health’s 
management of Covid-19 funds. For example, after the central government announced that it would 
cover the costs of treatment for people with Covid-19, as well as the funeral costs of those who died 
from the virus, rumours spread that local health workers were ‘negotiating’ the purchase of dead bodies 
to count them as infected deaths to get more government funding. 
Such incidents left customary authorities in Muanda and Gbadolite with two contradictory realities: On 
the one hand, they recognized that they needed to help enforce response measures decreed by the 
central government and, in particular, to help sensitize the population to comply with social distancing 
measures that would allow them to continue cultivating fields and engaging in other livelihoods 
activities. On the other hand, they knew that they were ultimately powerless in the face of non-
compliance by a sceptical and distrusting population. This required negotiating a middle ground 
between raising awareness about the risks of COVID-19 and convincing people of the dangers of a 
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disease that many considered remote or even imaginary, and another money-generating enterprise for 
the central state and its local representatives. 
In the east, many of these dynamics were intensified by legacies of civil and international conflicts, and 
the heavily militarised response to the Ebola outbreak. Responses to Covid-19 also confronted growing 
and often fierce local resistance to existing health interventions, including armed attacks on Ebola 
treatment centres, violence towards health centres, health workers, and Dignified and Secure Burial 
teams. Although such incidents often seem illogical to outsiders, people in the east have long criticized 
the police, army and, by association, humanitarian organisations’ disproportionate use of force when 
addressing Ebola (Freudenthal, 2019). They also argued that the mobilization against the epidemic was 
motivated by the fear of its spread to the rest of the world, rather than a desire to treat Congolese 
patients. Indeed, the response was experienced as being in sharp contrast to the limited response or 
even indifference to other existing threats. As one local resident told the authors, “we die more from 
war than from Ebola and no one cares about it”. For many, therefore, Ebola was a business opportunity 
for the state, international and national NGOs (I/NGOs). Conflicts between the Ministry of Health, 
I/NGOs and pharmaceutical companies, including the fraudulent introduction of an experimental 
vaccine, reinforced this suspicion (BBC, 2019). Similar statements were made by those we spoke to 
during Covid-19’s first wave, which people framed as a global priority that overlooked more immediate 
issues, including an ongoing measles pandemic and rampant insecurity. 
Regardless of this challenging history, police brutality and opportunism spread quickly following the 
announcement of COVID-19 response measures in Goma and Bukavu, the respective capitals of the 
easten DRC’s North and South Kivu provinces. As part of the declared state of emergency, provincial 
governors established police commissions to enforce measures. Members included health ministers, 
representatives of the police, army, intelligence services, and the hospitals selected to treat Covid-19 
patients. For local residents, the commissions’ most noticeable actions were stopping and fining those 
without face masks, often using roadblocks manned by officers and soldiers who circulated throughout 
the cities. The fines were confusing, not properly communicated and, therefore, not respected. Indeed, 
their implementation and amount depended on who you were and who you knew. In Bukavu, police 
also also worked with taxi drivers and intelligence services to create a shortage of public transport in 
anticipation of an 8pm curfew. They then induced traffic jams, which prevented people getting home, 
allowing them to be stopped, pulled from vehicles, and fined or arrested. At one field site, which lies on 
the DRC-Uganda border, close to Kasese, women were even beaten for attempting to cross a river to 
cultivate their crops on their land the DRC side; and soldiers were said to have sought money or sexual 
favours in return for turning a blind eye to unauthorized crossings. 
In response, residents in both provinces occasionally rose up against such abuses. The vast majority of 
this resistance was spontaneous, consisting of angry people supporting one another against perceived 
police overreach as it occurred. Nonetheless, there were more organised episodes. For example, the 
citizens of Essence - one of Bukavu’s poorest neighbourhoods, where people depend on mobility for 
their livelihoods - refused to remain in their houses and the police had no option but to flee the area. 
Youth also organised themselves to protest outside the city’s Bwindi treatment centre after a young taxi 
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driver was killed by police for not wearing a mask on June 15th. The boy was popular in his 
neighbourhood so that night youths took to the streets, protesting and burning tires until police fired 
bullets to disperse them. The next morning they blocked roads in Bagira commune while another group 
of youths went on to attack the Bwindi centre. 
However, our research suggests that this was not the full story. Those we spoke to linked the violence to 
a conflict between actors involved in the province’s COVID-19 response, specifically Governor Théo Kasi 
Ngwabidje, Dr Denis Mukwege, and members of the Ministry of Health. They had jointly decided to 
designate three hospitals for the treatment of COVID-19 patients: The Provincial Reference Hospital, the 
General Hospital of Panzi and the Saint Luc Hospital. However, a few days later, the Governor 
unilaterally took the decision to set up a centre in Bwindi for the care of the sick, thereby, sidelining 
these hospitals. In retaliation, Dr Mukwege publicly denounced a lack of transparency in the 
management of funds allocated to the province’s pandemic response by the central government. A few 
days later he also resigned from his position, apparently in an effort to safeguard his honour and that of 
Panzi Hospital, which he had founded. His resignation added to the population’s doubts about the 
official response to the epidemic and a growing perception that for some it was the latest business in 
town. A few days later his rival’s centre was attacked. 
The multiple causes of local resistance to the response are difficult to unpick. Yet, there is a negotiated 
line in the places where the authors work. Residents are accustomed to managing low-level extortion on 
the part of a predatory police force, which is usually proportional to the perceived socio-economic 
standing of the targeted individual. Arrests or trips to police stations, on actual or fabricated infractions, 
are avoided through contributions of ‘beans for the children’ or ‘water’ – small sums of money 
determined by the guilty party – for irregularly paid state officials. In exchange, the police are expected 
to let individuals go and to respond to their calls in cases of robbery or unrest in neighbourhoods. But 
our research pointed towards a growing feeling that the police and others had used the pandemic 
measures to cross this line, thereby breaking carefully negotiated social norms and practices, and 
running roughshod over the consent to the police’s fragile authority that they engender. In response, 
some neighbourhoods in Goma and Bukavu started community watches or hired military personnel to 
fulfil the role of unwelcome Covid-19-enforcing officers. In these ways, abuses and mistrust led to, albeit 
temporarily, pockets of public mutuality. 
 
Political stagnation and violent competition in South Sudan 
As in the DRC, South Sudan faced the dilemmas and potential devastation of Covid-19’s first wave whilst 
dealing with a pre-existing protracted complex crisis, including a civil war begun in 2013, a collapsed oil 
dependent economy and the absence of uniform public services. However, now it did so with a vacuum 
of state and local government. In February 2020, President Salva Kiir had issued a presidential decree 
removing all the governors, state ministers and commissioners. This was justified as a necessary 
prerequisite for establishing the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) that 
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was promised by South Sudan’s 2018 peace deal and looking more likely due to recent agreements 
between the young country’s warring parties. 
Many South Sudanese we spoke to wanted the government to directly appoint the states’ leaderships. 
They argued that the vacuum was already causing problems, such as exacerbating the long-running 
conflict between the Lou Nuer and Murlei in Jonglei state, as well as impeding a proper response to the 
virus in many areas. In their stead, the National Ministry of Health in collaboration with the WHO took 
the lead in disseminating information about the virus and outlining restrictions in mid-March that 
banned social gatherings, schooling, religious services and political rallies. This was followed by a night-
time curfew a few weeks later. This effectively halted some humanitarian organisations’ work, with 
many international staff leaving South Sudan. 
In Jonglei, trusted chiefs with long histories as powerful interlocutors between the government, aid 
agencies and communities were thrust to the forefront of response efforts. They travelled from 
community to community meeting with elders, church leaders and women’s groups to explain that the 
virus is real and counsel people’s growing despair. They also sought to counter distrust of foreigners, 
including United Nations workers, who were quickly associated with COVID-19, with some calling it “the 
Kawajas’ [white people] Virus” or the “town people virus”. Some chiefs carried buckets and soap to 
demonstrate good hygiene practices to communities. While to address a feared lockdown-induced 
secondary food crisis, they encouraged community members to share whatever they have with needy 
neighbours and, in some cases, provided money to the most desperate that contacted them through 
elders. 
There was another side effect of the first wave. Emerging anecdotal evidence suggested that the 
lockdown was also contributing to a rise in petty crime such as house break-ins, shop- and cattle- theft. 
In addition, organised youth cattle raiding across county borders was believed to have increased as a 
result of the heightened competition for resources due to the pandemic response measures. It is unclear 
whether chiefs were involved in sanctioning this or not. Regardless, chiefs are mandated by the 
Transitional Constitution of South Sudan and the Local Government Act, 2009, to handle petty crime 
cases in their courts. But the lockdown posed additional difficulties to the summoning of alleged 
perpetrators to account for themselves. Moreover, the vacuum meant some were also having to 
arbitrate more significant disputes to prevent episodes of violence. Thus, as Covid-19 cases rose during 
the first wave, the chiefs found themselves caught between their normal duties, the need to interpret 
and implement response measures, and to prevent more serious social unrest. 
 
Crisis, responses and statehood  
This paper has explored research from specific places within Uganda, the DRC and South Sudan during 
Africa’s first wave of Covid-19. We adopted a public authorities lens focussed on how pandemic 
response policies were perceived and interpreted at the local level. It revealed how some actors used 
the crisis to claim the legitimacy to govern others and to advance their own ends. We also found that 
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some people took the opportunity to challenge the status quo or reject the new normal, often by 
contesting poor leadership or engaging in forms of public mutuality. Although the studied contexts are 
unique, across them at least three patterns emerge:  
First, the pandemic responses fed into and exacerbated shifts in the balance of power between public 
authorities connected to the state and those with more ambiguous relationships. In Uganda, the 
government sought to consolidate its overall control and, in the process, to close down opportunities for 
those outside of its networks. With notable exceptions, the picture in the DRC was slightly more 
collaborative, with religious leaders lending their legitimacy to messaging from distrusted state and 
international actors. In contrast, in South Sudan the pandemic struck at a moment of political vacuum 
leaving traditional chiefs to take the lead in responding. Recent histories of upheaval, including the 
legacies of previous health crises, shaped these mobilisations and collaborations in ways that meant 
policies were rarely simply transplanted from plans to practice. This afforded some public authorities 
opportunities to strengthen their claims to power by calming anxieties, imparting knowledge, organising 
resources, and addressing the pandemic’s side effects.  
Second, contests for control over pandemic narratives and resources led public authorities to proclaim 
who was to blame, deserving of relief or a potential target of sanctions. In Uganda, the central state 
directed support to its followers, while its poor messaging created fears over the external and potential 
internal sources of the virus. It also gave security services opportunities to abuse their powers. Similar 
issues arose in the DRC where an outbreak of Ebola had already engendered distrust of foreign 
endorsed militarised health interventions. There was also widespread scepticism over the ability of 
authorities connected to the state to fairly police the pandemic or transparently handle vital resources, 
with violent backlashes in some places. In the absence of the state or a unified narrative, respondents 
suggested that South Sudan’s other public authorities may have intensified their violent competition 
over resources.  
Third, in parts of Uganda and the DRC these dynamics created resistance to pandemic responses and 
challenges to the status quo. Although this was mostly confined to grumblings and rumours over their 
true purpose, in some places resistance was more tangible and organised, even resulting in an attack on 
a state official’s property. The lockdown measures also gave young couples the opportunity to challenge 
rules that had long governed their courtships. In the eastern DRC resistance was more overt. Here, 
security services that had crossed unwritten lines were called out and even ejected from the places they 
were meant to serve. In some instances, this led to communities taking matters into their own hands 
and policing the pandemic themselves. Yet, many still suspected hidden hands were at play.  
Our research suggests that we should not uncritically subscribe to narratives that either praise or 
dismiss Africa’s response to the first wave. To understand how pandemic policies were implemented, it 
is necessary to look at the role of public authorities, especially in places where the state must compete 
for or does not monopolise authority. This has enabled us to show how response policies may have been 
declared with little capacity or intention to enact them transparently or fairly. We have also shown how 
those responsible for doing so on the ground viewed them as opportunities or burdens, with actors 
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having varying degrees of agency to interpret them as they see fit. This made some akin to miniature 
sovereigns, able to shape people's experiences of the pandemic and, by extension, the state in 
significant ways.  
Where this was predominantly one of power accumulation and abuse, it is likely that authorities' future 
responses to crises will be met with scepticism and rejections. So too may their efforts to define their 
visions of statehood. But where public authorities and communities were able to collaborate with the 
state or to carve out pockets of public mutuality to police themselves and provide alternatives to the 
status quo lessons should be learnt. Further research on such instances could be vital for those 
interested in how pandemic narratives, resources and local innovations can be better harnessed to 
address crises, especially where they require cooperation among public authorities with differing 
histories and levels of legitimacy to effect change in challenging places. 
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